(P29) Taming or Enabling Private Rule-makers? Assessing Resilience of Transnational Standardsetters
Enrico Partiti, Assistant Professor of Transnational Regulation and Governance, Tilburg University – Tilburg Law and Economics Centre
The complexity of the current transnational regulatory governance architecture is characterised by a large variety of regulatory forms and polycentricity, resulting in an increasingly structural hybrid nature. Public and private regulators’ complementarity represents a key feature in global regulation spanning from finance to manufacturing. Public regimes enlist and make use of private and self-regulators in the pursuit of regulatory goals, while private regimes implement (or interpret) public requirements. In a transnational space, not always can the relation between public and private components be of delegated authority and its associated means for control and review, but instead also encompasses a series of less legally structured dynamics whereby the public regulator enrols pre-existing private and self-regulators, or activates new ones.
Public regulators, at varying levels, may: base their rules on (or otherwise bring in) private standards; permit transnational private regimes to serve as evidence of compliance with regulatory requirements; or informally allocate a regulatory domain for private ordering provided that certain requirements are complied with. The implications of using transnational private regimes remains an understudied feature of transnational regulation. Are forms of association between public and private authority a possible venue to exert public control over private rule-makers, to steer them towards the public good, and to ultimately enhance their publicness? Or does the phenomenon instead result in a final capitulation to powerful ‘pen-holders’ that grow more influential and assertive in rule-creation the more they gain legitimacy from associating with public authority?
This panel welcomes both empirical and theoretical multi-disciplinary perspectives investigating the ramifications of public use of transnational private regimes. Possible contributions may address legal and non-legal mechanisms to tame transnational standard-setters, and their effectiveness; institutional changes within standard-setting bodies triggered by their interaction with public authority; implications for regulatory outcomes in the aftermath of interactions and, more generally, theoretical reflections over the resilience and metamorphosis of collective action in the regulation of the global economy, notably in the aftermath of exogenous shocks?